Security for Architects (Part 1)





Security/Privacy

Talking About Security...

- The goal is not to scare you!
- "Architecture in the wild"
- The cost of optimizations

Chat with your neighbor!

- How security-conscious are you?
- What steps do you take to ensure you privacy?
- What security expectations do you have of your computing devices?
- Should researchers work to uncover security vulnerabilities?

Outline

- Introduce the "security stack"
- Fundamental architecture security vulnerabilities
- Some mitigating architectures

Security Stack

What do I trust?



Security Stack

- How does hardware leak information? \bullet
- execution

```
for (;;) {
// super intense computation!
```

Side channels: Incidental information leakage inferred from observing normal



Architecture Security

- How precise can information be leaked from architecture behaviors?
- It depends...



main memory



Flush + Reload Attack



shared cache





Flush + Reload Attack

- So what? An attacker knows that I used libc...
- An example in the wild from RSA encryption/decryption e is secret!



$b^e \mod n$ where

Flush + Reload

- Shared libraries/software can be accessed by any processor
- Open-source software is out there to be analyzed
- Data dependent behavior can dictate the cache state/access times
- Spies can infer precise values from hits and misses to shared data

Flush + Reload: Chat with your neighbors!

- Is this vulnerability dependent on the cache?
- If we care about privacy, are we totally screwed?

Flush + Reload

- Dependent on clflush operation (10 points to RISC-V!)
- Dependent on very precise timers (nano seconds granularity!)
- What if the ISA/hardware didn't allow for such precise timing?

Prime + Probe

- Not so fast...
- impact of misses due to cache contention



• We may not be able to time individual accesses, but we can measure the

Prime + Probe



100 ms

100 ms



100 ms

Prime + Probe

- information?
- website fingerprinting

How much information can be leaked?

It depends!

• Wait, but this is information is much less precise... how would a spy use that

These attacks are generally used for leaking bigger picture information like





Architecture Mitigations

- How can we defend against these attacks? We need to understand what enables these attacks!
- Shared libraries can be an avenue for leaking information via Flush + Reload attacks
- Certain instructions make these attacks possible
- Shared hardware allows attackers to flush/probe your data

Architecture Mitigations

- Oblivious RAM: remove correlation between behavior and impact on architectural state
 - i.e., scan all of memory for every operation
- Trusted Execution: isolate the sensitive process in a specialized region of hardware
 - i.e., Intel SGX, ARM TrustZone, RISC-V Keystone, etc.
- Cache partitioning: each processor gets assigned to a region in each shared cache and can only access its region

Oblivious RAM

- Hide information by removing correlation between observations and inference • Often done at the algorithmic level (not really an architecture)
- Very theoretical

Trusted Execution

- Often very architecture dependent on what the specs are and what the guarantees are
- Separate caches for isolation, separate register state, etc...
- Often very slow!
- Subject to any underlying architecture vulnerabilities!

Cache Partitioning

- Provides isolation in the cache, which eliminates shared access
- Leads to inefficient use of the cache... fragmentation!
- Research into scalable cache partitions, but even these leak data!

Still to come!

- Spectre/Meltdown attacks
- Rowhammer attacks
- HertzBleed
- Bus Leakage

Concluding Thoughts

- You don't have to be scared about what is in your cache state, but you should be aware of what's in your cache state
- These vulnerabilities are born out of powerful, smart optimizations! But performance benefits aren't always for free...
- Working on mitigating these vulnerabilities well is an active ongoing effort!

So should I just give up and use an abacus?